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COMMENTS 
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-EXCLUSION OF SELF-SERVING DECLARA-
TIONS-One of the most venerable of all legal principles is the 
evidentiary rule excluding hearsay. This rule, which was first 
espoused by the English courts in the sixteenth century, arose 
when it became apparent that there was an inherent danger of 
untrustworthiness in a witness's uncorroborated recital of a prior 
declaration made outside the courtroom.1 The courts gave several 
reasons for regarding hearsay as untrustworthy. First, these state-
ments, offered into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted, 
were not made under oath.2 Secondly, objection to such testimony 
was raised because the trier of fact had no opportunity to pass on 
the absent declarant's credibility, since it was unable to observe 
the declarant' s demeanor on the stand. Also present was the danger 
that a witness orally reporting on an out-of-court statement might 
do so inaccurately. Finally, and most important, the adversary 
had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant whose out-of-
court statement was being offered in evidence.3 Although the ex-
clusionary rule as to hearsay is firmly established in the law, there 
are also a number of well-established exceptions to it. Typically, 
these exceptions were formulated by courts faced with situations 
in which the hearsay nature of the evidence was outweighed by 
considerations of necessity and circumstantial probability of reli-
ability.4 Many of the exceptions to the hearsay rule require that 
the declarant be insane, dead or otherwise unavailable.0 Under 
such circumstances, the hearsay testimony must be admitted if 
the trier of fact is to benefit at all from the declarant's knowledge. 
On the other hand, some of the most frequently invoked excep-
tions allow hearsay to be admitted in evidence even though the 
declarant is available.6 Despite the necessity of introducing a par-
ticular hearsay statement, it must have some degree of trustworthi-
ness before it will be admitted. Indeed, the exceptions were devel-
oped for those situations in which the danger of intentional 
fabrication was thought to be minimal. 
1 See generally McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 223-25 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoR-
MICK]; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1360-65 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. 
2 Wigmore indicates that the absence of an oath is not really a proper objection, but 
merely an incidental feature accompanying cross-examination. 5 WIGMORE § 1362, at 7. 
3 McCORMICK § 224, at 458-59; 5 WIGMORE §§ 1365, 1367-72. 
4 5 WIGMORE §§ 1420-22. 
5 For example, the common-law exceptions for dying declarations and business records. 
6 For example, the exception for spontaneous declarations. 
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Decisions involving the problem of hearsay evidence often 
contain statements to the effect that the declarations under scrutiny 
are "self-serving" and, therefore, incompetent.7 Moreover, many 
practitioners use the term "self-serving" as an indication of almost 
fundamental inadmissibility, on a plane with the general objec-
tion, "incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial." This so-called 
rule, that a party's out-of-court declarations favorable to his case 
cannot be admitted in evidence, apparently arose as a corollary to 
the rule rendering parties incompetent as witnesses.8 The old 
rule of incompetency denied the parties to any lawsuit, civil or 
criminal, the right to testify on their own behalf, the rationale 
apparently being that such a rule was necessary to eliminate self-
serving perjury. Fortunately, this rule was abolished during the 
nineteenth century. But its effects are still felt in the "dead man" 
statutes remaining in force in most states.9 In addition, a number 
of courts continue to articulate a separate evidentiary rule exclud-
ing self-serving hearsay. It is questionable, however, whether such 
a distinct rule in fact still exists. There is good reason to argue 
that the objection "self-serving" is epithetical only and does not 
state a unique exclusionary rule. 
Obviously, much self-serving evidence finds its way into most tri-
als, without an objection ever being raised, in the form of testimony 
given by the parties as witnesses on their own behalf. Out-of-court 
declarations offered in evidence, but not for the truth of the 
matter asserted, also escape exclusion in most cases even though 
in the declarant's interest.10 However, the so-called rule excluding 
self-serving statements has been applied by courts to a wide variety 
of hearsay statements. The large body of case law in this area 
suggests that any hearsay declaration which might bolster the 
declarant's case may be found to be "self-serving." In a majority 
of jurisdictions the application of the rule is limited, however, to 
statements which were in the declarant's interest at the time they 
were made.11 On the other hand, a few courts have held that the 
7 See, e.g., Brown v. General Ins. Co. of America, 70 N.M. 46, 369 P.2d 968 (1962), 
where the court stated: "That the declarations here are in the nature of purely self• 
serving statements is obvious. Self-serving declarations regardless of relevancy or material-
ity are incompetent." Id. at 51, 369 P.2d at 971. 
8 McCORMICK § 275, at 588. 
o Id. § 65. 
10 See, e.g., Lowber v. State, 29 Del. 353, 100 Atl. 322 (1917); Charles G. Clapp Co. v. 
McLeary, 89 N.H. 65, 192 Atl. 572 (1937). An illustration of evidence that is not introduced 
to prove that matter asserted would be a letter from one of the parties to a contract 
giving his interpretation of the agreement, where the purpose of the evidence was not 
to prove the obligations on the contract but rather what he thought they were. 
11 See, e.g., Lebrun v. Boston & Me. R.R., 83 N.H. 293, 298, 142 Atl. 128, 132 (1928); 
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rule is applicable whenever the declaration would be in the inter-
est of the party seeking to have it admitted, notwithstanding the 
fact that the declarant was disinterested at the time the statement 
was made.12 This latter approach facilitates the application of the 
so-called rule excluding self-serving statements,13 but can be criti-
cized for its exclusion of declarations whose trustworthiness has not 
been affected by the self-interest of the declarant. Typical of such 
an approach is the statement: "[W]e can see no ground for depart-
ing from the rule, that one cannot manufacture evidence for him-
self, although he may not be interested at the time."14 Referring to 
the "manufacture" of evidence seems to presume its unreliability, 
which is anomalous when one considers the lack of interest by 
the "manufacturer," the declarant, when the statement was made. 
Normally, declarations which are excluded because of their 
self-serving nature are those made by one of the parties to 
the instant litigation; however, this is not always true. Some courts 
have shown an inclination to disallow self-serving statements 
made by non-parties. This extension of the rule has been limited, 
however, to the declarations of persons in a close personal or legal 
relationship with the party attempting to offer the declarations 
in evidence. For instance, the unsworn declarations of an agent 
have been held inadmissible on behalf of the principal because 
they were self-serving.15 And parties claiming ownership of prop-
erty have been denied the use, as evidence in their own favor, of 
the self-serving declarations of their grantors.16 
As has been indicated, the rule precluding the admission of 
self-serving declarations is applicable almost exclusively to hear-
say statements. Moreover, it is often difficult to determine whether 
In re Kempf's Estate, 138 Misc. 704, 248 N.Y. Supp. 247 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Cowen v. T. J. 
Stewart Lumber Co., 177 Okla. 266, 58 P.2d 573 (1936); Green v. Fuller, 159 Wash. 691, 
294 Pac. 1037 (1930). 
12 E.g., Stone v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 106 Colo. 522, 107 P.2d 241 (1940); White v. 
Green, 50 N.C. 58 (1857). 
13 It is often difficult to determine the circumstances of the making of an out-of-court 
declaration, and to ascertain whether the declaration was affected by the declarant's 
interest at that time. A court following the latter approach need not concern itself with 
such a determination, but must determine only whether the statement is in the declar-
ant's interest when sought to be introduced in evidence. 
14 White v. Green, 50 N.C. 58, 60 (1857). 
15 See, e.g., Bracken v. Cato, 54 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1931); McClure v. Middletown 
Trust Co., 95 Conn. 148, 110 Atl. 838 (1920); Rice v. Armour & Co., 194 Iowa 144, 187 
N.W. 588 (1922); Harley v. Hartford Fruit Growers' & Farmers' Exch., 216 Mich. 146, 181 
N.W. 507 (1921). 
16 See, e.g., Durrell v. Bacon, 119 Cal. App. 31, 5 P.2d 961 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); 
Cryer v. McGuire, 148 Ky. 100, 146 S.W. 4 (1912); Sallan Jewelry Co. v. Bird, 240 Mich. 
346, 215 N.W. 349 (1927); Gorton v. Lane, 208 App. Div. 833, 204 N.Y. Supp. 31 (1924). 
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a court is stating a distinct rule of exclusion when it refuses to 
admit a statement, obviously excludable as hearsay, because it is 
"self-serving."17 Some courts quite clearly take the view that any 
so-called rule excluding self-serving declarations is included within 
the general rule excluding hearsay. Evidencing such an attitude 
is the following statement made by the Wyoming Supreme Court: 
"[T]here is no principle of evidence especially excluding self-
serving statements by an accused or anyone else. If they are in-
admissible, it is because they are hearsay or because of some other 
reason."18 But other courts appear to recognize a statement's self-
serving character as a ground for exclusion apart from the general 
hearsay rule. One court,19 for instance, while accepting the view 
that inadmissible hearsay received without objection is sufficient 
to sustain a verdict, held that the admission into evidence of a self-
serving declaration was a basis for reversal even though no ob-
jection was raised to its introduction during trial.20 Recognition 
of a distinction between the hearsay rule and a rule excluding self-
serving statements frequently appears in cases involving declara-
tions which are normally allowed in evidence under an exception 
to the hearsay rule. For example, in a suit by a son's wife for mali-
cious alienation of affections, the defendant mother-in-law offered 
testimony by another son that she had asked him to attempt a 
reconciliation, as indicative of her beneficent state of mind.21 The 
testimony was rejected by the court because it "was a self-serving 
statement by the defendant, not made in the presence of the plain-
tiff, and falls within no one of the exceptions that might make such 
a statement admissible in evidence."22 Again, in a Texas homicide 
case,23 the defendant was denied the opportunity to demonstrate 
his state of mind by having policemen testify that he had gone to 
17 Even more uncertain are cases where statements are excluded because "self-serving" 
and "hearsay.'' 
18 Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 468, 49 P.2d 649, 659 (1935). See also Caplan v. 
Caplan, 83 N.H. 318, 326, 142 Atl. 121, 127 (1928), where the court stated: "While in 
many cases it is pronounced that there is a general rule 'which precludes a party from 
supporting his cause by giving evidence of his own sayings' ••• as a rule it is merely a 
part of, and embraced within, the hearsay rule.'' 
19 W. W. Connor Co. v. McCollister &: Campbell, 9 Wash. 2d 407, 115 P.2d 370 (1941). 
20 See id. at 413, 115 P.2d at 372, where the court stated: "Though self-serving 
declarations are sometimes characterized as hearsay, we think there is sound reason for 
limiting the application of the rule to what is generally understood and characterized 
as hearsay evidence ••.• The vice of according probative value to ••. [a self-serving 
statement] is not obviated nor diminished because it may have been admitted without 
objection.'' 
21 Jacobs v. Jacobs, 281 Mass. 198, 183 N.E. 147 (1932). 
22 Id. at 199, 183 N.E. at 147. 
23 Woods v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 373, 28 S.W.2d 554 (1930). 
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them, told them that the deceased had threatened to kill him and 
asked them for protection. The court stated: "It appears that the 
declarations in question were made the day before the homicide. 
They were self-serving and properly rejected."24 If the statements 
in these two cases had been "normal" hearsay statements, not self-
serving in nature, it seems certain that they would have been ad-
mitted under the "state of mind" exception.25 
Although the language used by the courts in such cases is 
broad, the evidence does not appear to have been excluded solely 
because it was self-serving. A principal consideration in deciding 
whether evidence is admissible pursuant to the standard excep-
tions to the hearsay rule is the testimony's trustworthiness-its 
circumstantial probability of reliability. And the self-serving na-
ture of the statements may have been only one factor considered 
by the courts in determining whether the testimony in these cases 
was sufficiently trustworthy to be allowed under a hearsay rule 
exception. Indeed, substantial judicial authority supports this 
idea: there is only one exclusionary rule affecting hearsay evidence, 
and the self-serving nature of a statement is important merely in 
determining the applicability of an exception to that rule. This 
characterization, however, tends to oversimplify the results reached 
by the courts. These results perhaps are best presented by exam-
ining the approach taken by the courts in situations normally 
within specified exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
A party's out-of-court declarations as to his present mental 
impressions are usually admissible under an exception to the hearsay 
rule. When such statements refer to a state of mind existing as of 
the time of the statement and are made under circumstances in-
dicating apparent sincerity, the declarations are regarded as being 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted in evidence. Although a dis-
tinction exists between statements directly describing the declar-
ant' s thoughts or feelings and statements from which the declar-
ant's state of mind can only be inferred,26 the courts tend to treat 
both types of declarations as hearsay admissible under the "state 
of mind" exception.27 
When self-serving elements appear in these declarations, courts 
tend to show concern, in varying degrees, about their admissibility. 
24 Id. at 376, 28 S.W.2d at 555. 
25 See text accompanying note 27 infra. 
26 A statement of this latter type is actually not hearsay. McCORMICK § 228, at 465-66; 
6 WIGMORE § 1715. 
27 McCORMICK § 228, at 467-68. 
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Some jurisdictions have been quite liberal in admitting statements 
even though they were in the declarant's self-interest.28 These ju-
risdictions flatly reject a rule excluding all self-serving declarations, 
and treat self-interest as but one of several factors to be considered 
in determining whether the statement was sufficiently sincere to 
fall within the "state of mind" exception. Other courts have been 
more reluctant to admit declarations indicating a state of mind 
favorable to the declarant's position.28 The latter approach is best 
summarized by the following statement: 
"[T]he danger that declarations may have been made for a 
purpose, when they are sought to be introduced as evidence 
in favor of the person making them, has led to the exclusion 
of them, even on the issue of what was the intention or the 
state of mind of the declarant, unless they are made under 
circumstances as to give them corroboration. In general, such 
corroboration is found in the fact that they accompany and 
explain acts which of themselves would be competent evi-
dence on the issue involved. They are admissible as a part of 
the res gestae."30 
Although similar reasoning can be found in a variety of cases, it 
is particularly prevalent in the criminal law area, which apparently 
is why McCormick concludes that these courts apply a general rule 
excluding self-serving declarations when they are offered to prove 
a criminal defendant's peaceful intentions or his fear of the vic-
tim.31 It is true that the application of such a rule effects the ex-
clusion of self-serving declarations of intent or state of mind which 
are not closely connected in time with the alleged illegal act. But 
no court appears to have adopted a strict rule of exclusion of self-
serving utterances offered in evidence to show a declarant's state 
of mind.32 Even the Texas court, which refused to allow self-serv-
28 See, e.g., United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1944); Smith v. Smith, 364 
Pa. 1, 20 A.2d 530 (1950); Parsons v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 764, 121 S.E. 768 (1924); 
Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649 (1935). 
20 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 21 and 23 supra. See also Cranmore v. State, 129 So. 2d 
121 (Ala. Ct. App. 1961); State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746, 137 P.2d 133 (1943); Common-
wealth v. Binkiewicz, 342 Mass. 740, 175 N.E.2d 470 (1961); State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 
466, 116 S.W.2d 42 (1938). 
30 Viles v. Waltham, 157 Mass. 542, 543, 32 N.E. 901, 902 (1892). 
31 McCORMICK § 275, at 589. 
32 Although the language in the cases cited in note 29 supra indicates a reluctance 
to allow self-serving declarations in evidence, in several of these cases there are indica-
tions of other shortcomings in the evidence in question contributing to its inadmissibility. 
For instance, in State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W.2d 42 (1938), involving a speech 
made by the defendant to political subordinates two days prior to the homicide, the court 
distinguished a previous Missouri case, State v. Young, 119 Mo. 495, 24 S.W. 1038 (1894), 
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ing statements made by a defendant one day before the homicide,83 
had admitted, in an earlier case, a defendant's statement suggesting 
his apprehension over some difficulty with the deceased made two 
or three hours before the homicide.34 
Legal scholars have criticized those courts which are prone to 
exclude a criminal defendant's declaration because of its self-
serving nature. Wigmore35 has objected to the exclusion of any 
self-serving statements which, if made under the same circum-
stances but against the declarant's interest, would be allowed as an 
admission against the defendant. He has indicated that a decision 
based on the idea that a defendant could not "make evidence for 
himself" was begging the question, since the result is grounded 
on the assumption that the statements were false. Further, he ar-
gued that a court which based its reasoning on the premise that 
the accused, if guilty, would be likely to make false utterances 
was making an assumption contrary to the general doctrine that 
an accused is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. How-
ever, hearsay statements allowed in evidence under the "state of 
mind" exception are regarded as trustworthy for reasons other 
than hearsay introduced as an admission against interest, and there 
is no compelling reason to equate a self-serving declaration of 
intent with an admission against interest. Admissions are allowed 
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because it is felt 
that a party should not be allowed to question the trustworthiness 
of his own declarations.36 Probably there is also a general feeling 
that one who speaks against himself is not likely to fabricate. The 
very fact that a statement is against interest provides the requisite 
reliability for this type of hearsay. On the other hand, several 
factors, of which the self-serving nature of the declaration is one, 
may be important in deciding whether there is sufficient trust-
worthiness for the "state of mind" exception to be invoked. 
which had allowed in evidence a self-serving statement made by the defendant a month 
before the homicide. The court went on to state: "Neither did it [the self-serving speech] 
have such a connection with the unanticipated events that transpired during the election 
as to make it relevant and material." Id. at 484, 116 S.W.2d at 52. 
83 Woods v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 373, 28 S.W.2d 554 (1930). 
34 Poole v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 348, 76 S.W. 568 (1903). Evidence was held admissible 
"for what it was worth," as tending to shed light on appellant's frame of mind as to 
decedent at the time of the difficulty and the killing. See also Nelson v. State, 58 S.W. 
107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900), where testimony was allowed to show the defendant's 
intentions, his desire for peace, and apprehension of danger. 
85 6 WIGMORE § 1732. 
86 See, e.g., McCOitMICK § 239, at 503; MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE; COMMON SENSE AND COMMON 
LAw 143 (1947). See generally 4 WrGMORE §§ 1048-87; Morgan, Admissions as an Excep-
tion to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921). 
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Courts continue to distinguish between admissions and self-
serving declarations, even though the latter were made under 
circumstances in which there was no apparent motive to deceive. 
For instance, subsequent declarations regarding intent or motive 
for committing a prior act are generally inadmissible when self-
serving, but are allowed as admissions when against interest.37 
Moreover, statements made after the act which are relevant to a 
determination of the state of mind at the time of the statement, 
from which the state of mind at the time of the act may be inferred, 
are often treated similarly.38 Considering all the relevant argu-
ments, the better rule seems to be to admit a defendant's declara-
tions of fear or peaceful intentions, and those jurisdictions which 
hesitate to do so would be well advised to follow the lead of the 
more liberal courts. 
The res gestae exception89 to the hearsay rule has been maligned 
for its vagueness by writers40 and courts41 alike. It is discussed here 
because it is frequently invoked in cases involving self-serving 
statements. Since the term res gestae is now used in such a wide 
range of situations, it is difficult to determine the reason behind 
the exception. McCormick states that the exception is based on 
"the notion that evidence of a concededly relevant act or condition 
may bring in likewise the words which accompanied it."42 What-
ever its raison d'etre, the circumstantial probability of reliability 
certainly seems to stem from the spontaneity of the statement 
made as part of the res gestae. Spontaneity, as used in this context, 
refers to an almost involuntary exclamation. A judge must deter-
87 See, e.g., Moss v. State, 208 Ark. 137, 185 S.W.2d 92 (1945) (defendant told witness, 
some five minutes after the killing: "I shot that fellow-I had to kill him-he threw 
something at me"); State v. Crouch, 339 Mo. 847, 98 S.W.2d 550 (1936) (defendant told 
group of bystanders: "Boys, you know I had to do it in self-defense to save myself''); 
State v. Davis, 104 Tenn. 501, 58 S.W. 122 (1900). 
38 See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 8 Cal. 2d 502, 66 P.2d 631 (1937); State v. Brooks, 192 
Iowa 1107, 186 N.W. 46 (1922); Richardson v. State, 123 Miss. 232, 85 So. 186 (1920). 
But see United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1944); Kelly v. Bank of America, 
112 Cal. App. 2d 388, 246 P.2d 92 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); People v. Strew!, 246 App. Div. 
400, 287 N.Y. Supp. 585 (1936). 
30 See generally McCORMICK § 274; 6 WIGMORE §§ 1766-86. 
40 See, e.g., 6 WIGMORE § 1767; Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances 
Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922). 
41 See, e.g., United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944), where Judge 
Learned Hand stated, "as for 'res gestae', it is a phrase which has been accountable for 
so much confusion that it had best be denied any place whatever in legal terminology; 
if it means anything but an unwillingness to think at all, what it covers cannot be put 
in less intelligible terms"; Cox v. State, 64 Ga. 375, 410 (1879). See also Viles v. Waltham, 
157 Mass. 542, 543, 32 N.E. 901, 902 (1892). 
42 McCORMICK § 274, at 586. 
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mine, as best he can, whether the declaration was one made spon-
taneously or was the product of reflection and deliberation. The 
court's task is rather difficult when there is a substantial interval 
of time between the event and the statement. It is in such instances 
that the courts talk of the self-serving aspect of a statement. 
Although several decisions involving the res gestae exception 
have pointed out that the statement was in the declarant's self-
interest, in a significant number of these cases this aspect of the 
declaration was not the basis for exclusion; rather, the important 
factor was apparently that an extended period of time between the 
act and the declaration affords ample opportunity for contrivance.48 
This is perhaps best seen in those cases which hold that the self-
serving quality is of no importance if the declaration is admissible 
as a part of the res gestae.44 However, this is not to say that in all 
instances a court will disregard a statement's tendency to enhance 
a litigant's position. Indeed, McCormick indicates that under the 
"prevailing view" the self-serving nature of a statement, while 
not a conclusive reason for exclusion, is a factor to be considered 
in determining whether the statement was appropriately spon-
taneous so as to be a part of the res gestae.45 Illustrative of this 
position is a case in which a question arose as to the admissibility 
of plaintiff's statement, "I wish Austin hadn't been driving so fast," 
addressed to the testifying witness some four hours after an auto-
mobile accident.46 The court found that the record contained no 
offer of proof that the plaintiff's declaration arose out of the 
excitement of the accident and that the self-serving character "was 
properly to be considered under the circumstances."47 On the 
other hand, one court expressed the view that any self-serving 
statement, no matter how closely tied to an event, should be ex-
cluded.48 The court in this latter case felt that allowing such state-
ments to be introduced as evidence would so strongly tempt a 
party "to make evidence for himself" that there would be little 
chance that such testimony would be reliable. This strict view 
seems to have little, if any, following. 
43 See, e.g., Wescott v. Waterloo C.F. &: N. Ry., 173 Iowa 355, 155 N.W. 255 (1915); 
Burke v. Enders, 305 Mich. 270, 9 N.W.2d 918 (1943); Lange v. Auto Interurban Co., 
28 Wash. 2d 343, 183 P.2d 188 (1947). 
44 See, e.g., Hiatt v. Trucking, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 411, 103 N.E.2d 915 (1952); Shirks 
Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 637, 106 A.2d 46, 50 (1954). 
45 McCORMICK § 272, at 582. 
46 Bennett v. Bennett, 92 N.H. 379, 31 A.2d 374 (1943). 
47 Id. at 386, 31 A.2d at 380. 
48 Fisher v. Chicago &: N.W. Ry., 193 Minn. 73, 78, 258 N.W. 4, 6 (1934). 
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Records compiled in the course of conducting a business are 
hearsay when they are offered as evidence of the truth of the matter 
stated. Yet, because situations often arise where there is a special 
need for the information contained in such records, they have 
long been admitted in evidence under an exception to the hearsay 
rule.40 Although at common law this exception was generally re-
stricted to the admission of standard accounting entries, modern 
statutes extend the exception to almost any statement or record 
made in the ordinary course of business.50 Obviously, a great 
variety of self-serving statements are admitted under the business 
records exception,51 but the exception has been restrictively ap-
plied. In Palmer v. Hoffman52 the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed a decision excluding an accident report of a railroad 
engineer involved in a grade-crossing accident. The report had 
been compiled from an interview conducted by an assistant super-
intendent of the defendant railroad and a representative of the 
Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission. While it was the 
regular practice of the railroad to take such statements, the Court 
held that the report was not a regular business entry since it was 
not essential to the "systematic conduct" of the business, but had 
its "primary utility ... in litigating, not in railroading."53 The 
Court stated further that the federal statute54 required not only 
regularity of preparation but also records with "earmarks of reli-
ability ... acquired from their source and origin and the nature 
of their compilation,"1"1 suggesting that the self-serving nature of 
the report was the real reason for its exclusion. The Second Cir-
cuit had excluded the report because it was "dripping with motiva-
tions to misrepresent."56 The court of appeals also stated that the 
words "regular course of business," as contained in the statute, 
"according to the jargon of lawyers and judges . . . have always 
meant writings made in such a way as to afford some safeguards 
against the existence of any exceptionally strong bias or powerful 
motive to misrepresent."57 
40 See generally McCORMICK §§ 281-90; 5 WIGMORE §§ 1517-58. 
110 E.g., the Commonwealth Fund's Model Act and the UNIFORM BusINESS REcoRDS 
AS EVIDENCE Acr. 
51 For example, the typical books of account offered from a party's own files. 
112 !ll8 U.S. 109 (1943). 
53 Id. at ll4. 
114 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958). The federal statute adopted the provisions of the Model 
Act proposed by a committee of the Commonwealth Fund, whose conclusions were pub-
lished in MORGAN et al., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE; SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM (1927). 
Iii! 318 U.S. at ll4. 
56 Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942). 
117 Id. at 984. 
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The approach indicated by the Supreme Court in the Palmer 
decision has been widely criticized.58 The language of the federal 
statute leaves to the trial judge the question of whether an entry 
"was made in the regular course of ... business," but limits his 
discretion by requiring that "all other circumstances of the mak-
ing of such a writing of record . . . may be shown to affect its 
weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility."119 Writers, in 
denouncing an interpretation calling for the consideration of a 
business entry's self-serving character, have pointed to this stat-
utory language and to the intention of the drafters of the Model 
Act, which was the prototype for the federal statute, that a declar-
ant's self-interest was to affect the weight, but not the admissibility, 
of the declaration. 60 
Nevertheless, several of the lower federal courts have indicated 
that the self-serving nature of a report is something to be con-
sidered in deciding whether or not to admit it.61 Nor is the import 
of the Palmer decision limited to the federal court system. Several 
state legislatures have joined the federal government in adopting 
the Model Act.62 Moreover, several other states have enacted the 
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, which, though similar 
to the Model Act, by its very language vests the trial judge with 
the discretionary power to exclude a business record if "the sources 
of information, method and time of preparation" are not "such as 
to justify its admission."63 Courts in states which have adopted the 
Uniform Act have refused to allow in evidence records which 
would qualify under this statutory exception but for their self-
serving nature.64 Illustratively, in a case involving an action for 
payment of an account, the defendant was not allowed to place in 
evidence a check stub, purportedly filled out when a check was 
58 See, e.g., MAGUIRE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 156; Morgan, The Law of Evidence 
1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv. 480 (1946). 
59 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1958). 
60 E.g., Note, Business Entry Statutes, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 920, 925 (1948); Note, 
56 HARv. L. REv. 458, 467-68 (1942) (Maguire commenting on the Second Circuit's 
decision). 
61 See, e.g., Hartzig v. United States, 217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Sharples 
Chems., Inc., 209 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1954); Korte v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 191 F.2d 
86 (2d Cir. 1951); Pekelis v. Transcontinental &: W. Airlines, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951). But see Nutting v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 
1956). 
62 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 78 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 600.01-.04 (1947); 
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.40 (Page Supp. 1962). 
63 UNIFORM BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE ACT § 2. 
64 See, e.g., Terrel v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 327 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. 1959); Dickson 
v. Gastl, 64 Ohio App. 846, 28 N.E.2d 688 (1940); Williams v. Caples, 342 Pa. 230, 20 A.2d 
302 (1941). 
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drawn and delivered to plaintiff's agent.65 Defendant's managing 
partner had testified that the stubbing of checks was a procedure 
used in the course of conducting the business, and a regular prac-
tice, of the defendant firm. The court stated, however, that the 
legislature, in adopting the Uniform Act, "did not intend thereby 
to make ... competent in evidence that which theretofore had 
been repeatedly held to be incompetent for various unassailable 
reasons," the "unassailable reason" in this particular case being 
the self-serving nature of the check stub.66 
Although deemed an appropriate restriction on the business 
records exception in many instances, it is quite evident that the 
courts have not applied a strict exclusionary rule to every entry 
which is made in the regular course of business and which might 
prove useful to the entrant. Indeed, in those jurisdictions which 
have enacted the Model Act, it appears that in order to be ex-
cluded an entry must not only be self-serving but it must have been 
made under circumstances where there would be a substantial 
motive to misrepresent. Even the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which seems to interpret the Palmer decision as having 
excluded a record because it was self-serving,67 has admitted a 
trust company's history sheets on two of its trust accounts in a 
suit based on the trustee's alleged bad faith, over an objection that 
these documents were self-serving and not made in the regular 
course of business.68 Although the sheets were obviously compiled 
with some motive of protecting the trustee in case of a subse-
quent complaint by a beneficiary, the court did not mention their 
self-serving quality, but instead found them to be records which 
are kept in the regular course of a trustee's business. Courts in 
jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Act are more likely 
to exclude self-serving entries than are courts subject to the Model 
Act. But even the former courts have recognized an intent by 
those who promulgated the Uniform Act "to broaden the scope 
of admissibility of records made in the regular course of business" 
and have admitted records of a self-serving nature. 69 
Although some language in opinions indicates that there is a 
or; Zeigler Milling Co. v. Denman, 79 Ohio App. 250, 72 N.E.2d 686 (1946). 
66 Id. at 253, 72 N.E.2d at 688. 
67 See, e.g., Pckclis v. Transcontinental & W. Airlines, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951). 
68 Waters v. Kings County Trust Co., 144 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1944). 
69 Henderson v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 65 Idaho 570, 581, 149 P.2d 133, 139 (1944). 
Sec also Arquc v. National Superior Co., 67 Cal. App. 2d 763, 777, 155 P.2d 643, 651 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1945). 
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"rule" excluding self-serving declarations, separate from the hear-
say rule, the self-serving element seems to be actually little more 
than one of a variety of factors considered by a judge in deciding 
whether evidence meets the requirements of a standard hearsay 
exception and so may be given to the jury. Yet, this latter character-
ization has not been clearly stated in judicial opinions. What ap-
pears to be needed is a lucid statement by the courts to the effect 
that the element of self-interest is only one of several factors to 
be considered before admitting a hearsay statement into evidence. 
Despite the frequency with which the phrase "self-serving" ap-
pears in the reported decisions, it is uncertain how heavily the fact 
of self-interest weighs in a determination of a statement's admis-
sibility. Too often statements are excluded as self-serving without 
any further discussion of the matter. Nevertheless, it is apparent 
that, in circumstances where a party attempts to use his own out-
of-court statements to bolster his case, the judiciary is reluctant 
to relinquish to the jury its power to screen hearsay statements. 
Admittedly, some courts are quite liberal in the manner in which 
they allow such statements to go to the jury, giving to the jury 
most statements that fall within a hearsay exception, notwithstand-
ing their self-serving nature. However, even in such jurisdictions 
complete control has not actually been relinquished to the jury; 
the self-serving nature of a statement is still properly considered 
before the statement is admitted as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. Other jurisdictions are even more restrictive, and are less 
likely to give a jury the chance to determine the importance of 
the fact that a statement was made in the declarant's interest. 
Perhaps the jury should be shielded from some, if not most, 
of the self-serving, out-of-court utterances made by the litigants. 
After all, the hearsay rule itself was adopted to keep inherently 
untrustworthy statements from the jury, the feeling evidently 
being that the jury could not give proper consideration to the fact 
that the statements were made out of court, and are not subject to 
cross-examination.70 No attempt is here made to assess the capa-
bilities of the modern jury. But it is worthwhile to give at least 
some consideration to a proposal whereby the jury, rather than 
the judge, would weigh the self-serving nature of a statement 
otherwise within an exception to the hearsay rule. Wigmore ar-
70 Contrast jury trial with cases tried before a judge or an administrative tribunal 
where hearsay is admitted, its unreliable nature to be taken into consideration by the 
trier of fact. 
1963] COMMENTS 1319 
gued for this kind of arrangement in criminal cases.71 And, if a 
statement is deemed to be otherwise within an exception and suf-
ficiently trustworthy, there seems little reason for withholding it 
from the jury merely because it is self-serving.72 This is particularly 
true in those jurisdictions where the judge is allowed to comment 
on the evidence, and could instruct the jury to consider a state-
ment's self-serving character. 
On a broader plane, there is some merit in the contention, set 
forth by one writer,73 that the testimony of a party on the witness 
stand as to his own self-serving, out-of-court statement is not even 
subject to the hearsay rule because he is now under oath and sub-
ject to cross-examination with respect to that statement. Although 
this argument incorrectly transforms a statement made outside 
the courtroom into non-hearsay, it recognizes the presence of 
elements which may obviate some of the reasons for the hearsay 
rule. These elements are present even when a non-party provides 
the testimony. Since the objection of "self-serving" almost always 
arises with respect to statements made by a party, the declarant is 
normally in the courtroom and available for cross-examination, 
under oath, as to his prior out-of-court statements. However, some 
problems may arise as to whether the party can be cross-examined 
about his prior statement when the testimony reciting that state-
ment comes from another witness; such practice is particularly 
questionable when the party is a criminal defendant who does not 
voluntarily take the stand. In addition, it must be realized that an 
in-court cross-examination of a previous out-of-court statement is 
not completely satisfactory from the standpoint of the declarant's 
opponent.74 
Although cross-examination may lack some of its normal effec-
tiveness when conducted in this manner, the objections to a self-
serving statement, otherwise within an exception to the hearsay 
rule, are reduced in such a situation to a point where the state-
ment could be given to a jury. If the party seeking admission of 
the statement were willing to take the stand to be cross-examined 
71 See text accompanying note 35 supra. 
72 See McCORMICK § 275. See also Deeb v. State, 131 Fla. 362, 383, 179 So. 894, 903 
(1938), where the court stated: "It was competent for the accused to testify as to the 
nature of the prior encounter and its relation, if any, to the homicide; even though it be 
not proper to testify to the merits or the details of the prior difficulty .•.. The weight 
and credibility of the testimony are for the jury to determine" (Emphasis added.); Parsons 
v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 764, 121 S.E. 768 (1924). 
73 Hardman, Hearsay: "Self-Serving" Declarations, 52 W. VA. L. REv. 81, 93 (1950). 
74 See 5 WIGMORE § 1368, at 34. See also State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 
898 (1939). 
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as to the truth of his out-of-court declaration, the statement should
be allowed in evidence. While the trial judge should have broad
discretion in deciding whether or not such cross-examination will
adequately compensate the declarant's adversary for any prejudice
resulting from the admission of self-serving hearsay, it would seem
that this technique would sufficiently protect the opposing party
in most cases.
John M. Price, S.Ed.
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